Squaring the Circle: Correlation
Does Not Equal Causation
How can we square the circle
between competing ideologies in education and the science of learning? The convergence
is no easy feat – ideologies prejudice and evolve over time and are guided by vested
interest; scientific findings and the truth
of reality does not (or should not) discriminate at its own convenience, nor
does it have to conform to the reality in which we desire. If understanding the
truth about the science of learning is
our objective, then it stands to reason that ideologies must take a backwards
step in the decisions made about education.
I recognise that some people are
of the opinion that scientific research is also ideological. On this I make two points. Firstly, as noted above,
the science of learning in epistemically concerned with truth. As such, it ought
to be subject to the same rigorous and systematic testing of any scientific
research; it must also and also be open to falsification. Secondly, and more
importantly, scientific research differentiates on the basis of methodology. I have
touched on this point in several of my past blogs. These two ideas are not distinct
but rather inform one another. If this distinction is correct, and I believe it
is, then it is imperative to understanding the paradigmatic shift currently
underway in educational research - from intuition to evidence. Falsifiability
requires a methodology and strict criteria that gives credibility to ideas –
these ideas, whether born out of intuition or experiment, must provide
evidence, explanatory power, predictive success, and survive counter-evidence that
would otherwise undermine its credibility. Generally, educational research has
not upheld this rigor. This is indicative of the fact that education has been a
hallmark of social scientific study and not scientific study itself. In other blogs I have shown how this has been exploited in the education system.
The fact remains, we must begin
with the science of learning and build theories of teaching to compliment. These theories of learning
cannot be ideological, nor can they be credentialed on the basis of intuitive
based justifications – they will claim truth,
but they lay no bearing on providing the necessary evidence it takes to
claim something is true. This is in
the abstract – let’s look at something more concrete.
A major
paradigm in educational research has been
Constructivism. Fundamentally, constructivism provides a theory of learning
which suggests that humans construct knowledge based on an ‘active creation’
between prior knowledge and new experiences in the world. Constructivism has
provided a gamut of theories of teaching that translate the theory of learning into an applicable theory of
teaching. Just think of repercussions that
this theory of learning implies: it see’s teaching of knowledge transfer as
futile insofar as information can only be subject to interpretation; it advocates
for teacher as ‘facilitator’ and dismisses ‘chalk and talk’ or direct and
explicit instruction; it asks for ‘minimal guidance, ‘problem-based’, ‘real world’,
‘experiential’, ‘Inquiry’ teaching; it helps market and provide evidence for a
whole range of educational products. Now I am in no way saying constructivism
has no place in education – I hope to establish the opposite in good time. But
it cannot lay claim to providing an explanation of the truth behind the science of learning, and it cannot do this for one
very good reason – it uses intuitive justifications as explanations of how learners learn. I will put it
another way: constructivism uses our biologically driven theory of mind to attribute intentionality and mental states to
other people – just look at the discourse of ‘active agent’ and ‘meaning maker’
and so forth. This discourse is all based in Folk Psychology, and as I have stated previously, folk psychological principles must be reducible to
scientific principles in order to provide an accurate and objective account of
the science of learning. So is constructivism consistent with scientific
findings? Here is where it becomes rather complex.
Constructivism as
a theory of learning is highly unscientific. All the folk psychological
principles outlined above cannot be reduced to scientific principles: ‘meaning
maker’ and ‘active agent’ are not elusive but, rather, illusory. According to
Eliminativists, this means the concepts need to be abolished. But we cannot
forget that we are in the business of interacting with human beings – human interaction
is not epistemically concerned with truth
but is concerned with all the wonderful experiences and connections we make
with our students and the joy that brings to our lives. Our students, to us,
are not (insofar as we interact with them and they experience the world) merely
neurons and electro-physical interactions. We attribute them with mental states
for three good reasons: firstly, it is biologically determined that we do so;
secondly, because we ourselves experience in a manner which folk psychology
describes with a high degree of accuracy and we attribute the same experiential
phenomena to our students through empathic relationships; lastly, because students
experience the world and have intentions, hopes and desires. Irrespective of
the truth behind the science of learning, we can never square the circle
between the reductionist truths that science discloses and the folk psychological
ideologies that give meaning to our lives and define our experiences in the
world because the two are necessarily incommensurable.
On the other
hand, there is plenty of ‘evidence’ to suggest that constructivism is conducive
to educational outcomes. Whether or not it is scientific in its explanatory
power, it can still provide a means of facilitating learning and conceptual
growth in students - It is not an inhibitor to learning and as a theory of
teaching is widely used in order to achieve educational outcomes. How can this
be so? How can it be a successful theory of teaching without there being any credible
evidence for it? It’s simple: constructivism is a good theory of teaching but a
false theory of learning. Let’s explore this in more detail.
Correlation does not equal causation. So
often does this provide an answer to seemingly apparent paradoxes and
contradictions that it seems almost trivial as a response. Alas the correlation
between constructivist theories of teaching and the achievement of educational
outcomes cannot, in itself, be the cause
of those educational outcomes. In other words, the constructivist theory of
teaching itself is not the cause of the educational outcomes but approximates something
that can be reducible to a scientifically understood principle of learning. Surely
we arrive at misnomer? But this must be true as in the case that all claims to
truth must be consistent with the laws that govern everything in this universe.
So what next?
Even though
students are not ‘active agents’, their experience in the world tells them
otherwise: their efficacy (science of learning) in achieving tasks relies on the
feeling of agency and independent inquiry (feeling of meaning making); students
self-reflect on their learning (feeling of ownership), even if they have far
less deliberate, controlled and linear control than it appears they have (science
of learning); students feel they are thinking about problems (active agents)
even if they are recalling memory and storing reformed memories (science of
learning) – these are the narratives that students tell themselves, and
teachers tell of students, in order for learning to take place. Despite this,
the concepts will always be elusive to science because they are illusory and
products of physical interactions in the brain. This is why, when all things
considered, we need to build theories of learning and teaching that consider
both the phenomenological and the naturalistic perspectives: the
phenomenological will never be able to disclose the truth of the science of
learning, but by the same token, the science of learning (even through
reduction) will never be able to disregard the phenomenology of conscious
learning experience, even if it can account for it. Both are needed in order to
design better educational systems.
If everything I
have stated so far is correct (as a scientific hypothesis it’s open to
falsification) then it has a very interesting implication, which I will get to
briefly. But my first point is this: I am sceptical of the ease by which translating theories of learning into
theories of teaching is currently being done. Not only is it a great way of marketing products as ‘evidence based’, but it seems an overly superficial process
(but nonetheless an intuitive one) by which a theory of teaching is designed to
superficially embody on the theory of learning – pretty logical and simple. In Homo
Economicus I stated:
“For Theories of Learning, we can
use Behavioural Economics as an exemplar in the utilisation of naturalism as beneficial for enhancing an understanding of the underlying principles involved in
decision making – in our case, educational not economic. For Theories of
Teaching, there is an exemplary application
of these understandings to enhance
economic outcomes, or in our case, educational outcomes. These outcomes,
however, come at a contentious and foreseeable cost: they are deceptive insofar as they utilise these
understandings to enhance economic outcomes. The great moral question for education, however, would be whether we should use
the same deception to enhance
learning outcomes. Theories of Teaching, built on these principles, would look
vastly different from the way in which we design Theories of Teaching now as we
currently aim to provide a transparent and harmonious association between Theories
of Learning and Theories of Teaching. Behavioural Economics does not
disseminate its theories in manifestly transparent ways in which allow the
individual to transcend their impulses – it exploits the consumer on the basis
of deception in order to enhance capital gain. I am not sure what is to be
taken away from this… perhaps I will return to this at some time in the future.”
If we are to
take the science of learning seriously, just as behavioural economics took the
science of economics seriously, then we necessarily
cannot produce theories of teaching that ‘superficially embody’ the theory of
learning – that would disregard the narratives and phenomenological perspectives
of the learner which would have catastrophic implications for learning. Take
for example Willingham’s thesis that students don’t like school because the
brain is not built for thinking. Now this theory, consistent with scientific
research, is a theory of learning: students rarely think when faced with
problems but rather revert to memory recall as a ‘quick and dirty’ solution
that conserves energy best spent on more pressing matters like survival or
reproduction. If we built a theory of teaching that ‘superficially embodied’
this theory, not only would it be highly unethical but it would by highly demoralising
and counterproductive for producing educational outcomes. It also, might I add,
runs contrary to our folk psychological intuitions that we attribute to the
learner too – despite knowing that the reduction
of what we could perceive as “lazy thinking” is actually optimal and conducive
to the survival of the individual, we still attribute the folk psychological
principle of ‘disengaged’ or ‘lazy’ because we know that is a sign of ‘lazy
thinking’ and ‘disengaged learning’. When communicating to the student it would
be of no benefit to say that they are behaving in an optimal way as our
measurement of success is learning and educational outcomes. We can’t let the
truth get in the way of a good story – if we did it would become an impediment
to learning.
So what then?
How do we build a theory of teaching based on what we know about the science of
learning if it can’t mirror the science of learning? Remember in Homo Educationist I stated economists deceive customers
into thinking they have more agency in consumer choice than they really have?
And in The Story so Far I referred to psychotherapy and the ‘talking cure’ as a
means of ailing psychological conditions despite the correlation between
improvement and lack of causation? The same must be the true of learning. In
the same way talking deceives patients into thinking they have overcome their
ailments; in the same manner behavioral economists deceive their customers
into thinking they are making choices about products; teachers should be
deceiving students in a manner that nudges
them out of their default modes and engages them more deeply in their
learning – and I say deeply in the
purely folk psychological sense, whatever it means.
The
science of learning has disclosed how learning takes place - memory recall is a
great example of the same type of deception as noted in behavioural economics.
You are not telling the students that their brains are mediating memory
readjustment in the hippocampus – you are providing experiences for this to
occur and utilising the narrative of phenomenology (or how this physical
process appears in consciousness) to allow for this process to happen. I have
said it before, and I will say it again: to build successful theories of
teaching, we must begin with the science of learning. Only from here can we
build theories of teaching that will truly and accurately utilise the science
of learning to produce quality educational outcomes. We must overcome our
disposition to build theories of teaching based
on theories of learning that superficially model and are born out of logical
and intuitive inferences. Translation ought
not be a logical process but a deceptive one that converges two incommensurable
frameworks (the phenomenological and the scientific) in a manner that enhances
and compliments the principles that the science of learning has disclosed.
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